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Abstract
We present a fully relational definition of inertial systems based in
the No Arbitrariness Principle, that eliminates the need for absolute
inertial frames of reference or distinguished reference systems as the
“fixed stars” in order to formulate Newtonian mechanics. The histor-
ical roots of this approach to mechanics are discussed as well. The
work is based in part in the constructivist perspective of space ad-
vanced by Piaget. We argue that inertial systems admit approxima-
tions and that what is of practical use are precisely such approxima-
tions. We finally discuss a slightly larger class of systems that we call
“relatively inertial” which are the fundamental systems in a relational
view of mechanics.
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1 Introduction
In the wording of Newton, “absolute time”, “absolute space” and “absolute
motion” [Newton, 1687, Escholium to Definition VIII] are the ingredients of con-
cern in the formulation of the laws of mechanics. These ideas led to a core concept
of Newtonian mechanics, namely that of inertial frame, i.e., the frame(s) on which
free bodies move with constant velocity (or where changes in the velocity of a
body correspond to forces/interactions). However, Newton’s concept of abso-
lute space rests on multiple grounds, some of them fundamental for his theory of
mechanics, others more adapted to his philosophical taste while not mandatory
for the laws of motion.
Newton’s philosophical position was challenged by Leibniz who questioned
the “absolute” character of space on philosophical and theological grounds, pro-
posing that space is not absolute and prior to the objects we observe, but it is
indeed given by the relations among objects, a standpoint that came to be called
relationism. Other relationist positions were later held by C. Neumann, Streintz,
Mach, Thomson and Langer [DiSalle, 1990], although arriving to different con-
clusions. Neumann and Streintz assumed the existence of a privileged frame
(the ’Alpha Body’ in Neumann and ’any free body’ in Streinz, [DiSalle, 1990])
while Mach questioned absolute space as a metaphysical construct. Thomson and
Langer, on the other hand, attempted to construct inertial frames based on the
motion of free bodies.
The notion of absolute space in Newton presents several aspects (for a recent
discussion based in the work by H. Stein, see [DiSalle, 2020]) but not all of them
are operational, i.e., have consequences in the formulation and explanatory power
of the theory. For Newton:
Definition 1.1. Absolute space
Absolute space, in its own nature, without regard to anything external,
remains always similar and immovable. Relative space is some mov-
able dimension or measure of the absolute spaces; which our senses
determine by its position to bodies; and which is vulgarly taken for
immovable space;[...]
and later, further discussing about the properties of space he writes:
Definition 1.2. True motion
The causes by which true and relative motions are distinguished, one
from the other, are the forces impressed upon bodies to generate mo-
tion. True motion is neither generated nor altered, but by some force
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impressed upon the body moved; but relative motion may be gener-
ated or altered without any force impressed upon the body. [Newton,
1687]
It is true motion what is operational in Mechanics and furthermore, there is no
deductive reasoning that brings us from absolute space into true motion and much
less, there is a form to logically infer the first notion from the acceptance of the
second. In Newton’s belief absolute space is where absolute (or true) motion takes
place (“Absolute motion is the translation of a body from one absolute place into
another;[...]” [Newton, 1687]).
The relationist position sustains that there are only spatial relations between
bodies, and consequently, space is not more than a construction that allows to
present such relations, easily connecting with our intuitions. Piaget [Piaget, 1999,
Ch. 1] observed that basic notions of space emerge during the first month of child-
hood simultaneously with the notion of object and the discovery of “permanence”
(and then change) as well as groups of operations. The relationist position was
presented by Leibniz in his exchange with Clarke, who defended Newton’s view.
The centre of the exchange between Clarke and Leibniz is precisely what goes
from Definition 1.1 to Definition 1.2 and the necessity, as well as correctness, of
the first one. No dispute emerges regarding the second notion. Leibniz initiates
the discussion by objecting
Newton says that space is an organ— · like a sense-organ · — by
which God senses things. But if God needs an organ to sense things
by, it follows that they don’t depend entirely on him and weren’t pro-
duced by him.[Leibniz, 2007, first letter]
a theological argument indeed. By the fifth exchange, the objection had evolved
into an epistemic one:
"I answer that indeed motion doesn’t depend on being · observed,
but it does depend on being · observable. When there is no observ-
able change there is no motion—indeed there is no change of any
kind. The contrary opinion is based on the assumption of real abso-
lute space, and I have conclusive refuted that through the principle of
the need for a sufficient reason." [Leibniz, 2007, fifth letter]
Leibniz’ positioning is epistemic, and concerns a sort of “hygiene of reason” that
can later be found in Peirce:
A hypothesis is something which looks as if it might be true and were
true, and which is capable of verification or refutation by comparison
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with facts. The best hypothesis, in the sense of the one most recom-
mending itself to the inquirer, is the one which can be the most readily
refuted if it is false. [Peirce, 1994, CP 1.120]
and later
Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was recognised
by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis
–which is just what abduction is– was subject to certain conditions.
Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a hypothesis, un-
less it be supposed that it would account for the facts or some of them.
[Peirce, 1994, CP 5.189]
The first notion of absolute space (1.1) does not admit experimental refutations
since nothing is logically deduced from it. The totality of Newton’s arguments
such as the famous “bucket” 2[Barbour, 1982] rests upon the insight on absolute
space given by “true motion”, Definition 1.2.
Thomson went one step further in the discussion arguing that the second form
can be deduced from spatial relations between objects and he named “inertial
frames” the systems providing the references that fulfil the requirement. In this
form, the “sensorium of God” [Leibniz, 2007] is deemed not only epistemologic-
ally improper but unnecessary as well.
A better known line of argumentation was entertained by Mach:
Newton’s experiment with the rotating vessel of water simply informs
us, that the relative rotation of the water with respect to the sides of the
vessel produces no noticeable centrifugal forces, but that such forces
are produced by its relative rotation with respect to the mass of the
earth and the other celestial bodies. [Mach, 1919, p. 232]
Later he returns to the point with his famous view with regard to the fixed stars,
while confronting Streintz about Newton’s distinction between absolute and rel-
ative rotation (that Streintz accepts):
For me, only relative motions exist [...], and I can see, in this regard,
no distinction between rotation and translation. When a body moves
relatively to the fixed stars, centrifugal forces are produced; when
it moves relatively to some different body, and not relatively to the
fixed stars, no centrifugal forces are produced. I have no objection to
calling the first rotation "absolute" rotation, if it be remembered that
nothing is meant by such a designation except relative rotation with
respect to the fixed stars. [Mach, 1919, p. 543]
2Search for “vessel” in [Newton, 1687]
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It has been already indicated that Mach in this respect misses the point [Borzeszkowski
and Wahsner, 1995]. Let us explain the matter with a simple example that may
be reproduced at home. Consider first the Olympic sport of “hammer throw”. To
make the throw the athlete makes the hammer rotate around a vertical axis that
goes approximately from his feet to a point in the line from his body to the ham-
mer. The hammer can be said to rotate around the vertical axis and the athlete
rotates around the same axis. To play the sport strong muscles are needed to pull
from the hammer producing the internal force needed to rotate. Newton would
call this absolute rotation because force and motion are in correspondence. Let
the hammer rest on the floor and spin around your feet. Observe how all objects
around appear to rotate (in a geometrical sense) relative to you. Despite some of
the objects being far more massive than the hammer, they rotate almost effort-
less. Newton calls this apparent or relative rotation as it lacks correspondence
between force and geometrical description. Since reality cannot be reduced to
geometrical appearance we have to distinguish both situations. As indicated in
[Borzeszkowski and Wahsner, 1995], Mach’s difficulties are rooted in his philo-
sophical standing as empiricist.3 It is interesting to recall that Newton had rejected
the idea of the absolute space being in correspondence with fixed stars.
... For it may be that there is no body really at rest, to which the places
and motions of other may be referred.
But we may distinguish rest and motion, absolute and relative, one
from the other by their properties, causes and effects. It is a property
of rest, that bodies really at rest do rest in respect to one another. And
therefore, as it is possible that in remote regions of the fixed stars, or
perhaps far beyond them, there may be some body absolutely at rest;
but impossible to know, from the position of bodies to one another
in our regions whether any of these do keep the same position to that
remote body; it follows that absolute rest cannot be determined from
the position of bodies in our regions. [Newton, 1687]
3The idea that natural science rests on experience is not controversial. What is controversial is the
form in which the observed (or sensed) becomes an idea, the process of ideation. Most empiricists
consider the observed as the fact and the fact as the real, thus effectively suppressing the subject,
they become realists (objective) by the unconscious action of ignoring the process of production
of ideas. For other philosophers such as Peirce [CP 5.145 1994], there is an ideated reality and an
observable reality; they bear the relation that exists between universal and particular. Experience
is experience of the particular (uniquely situated in time and space an in several other forms) and
cannot be used in any other case. This particular experience fosters and tests explanatory ideas,
conjectures; by the processes of abduction experiences nourish the real (ideated) which is always
transitory, a temporary belief. By the process of interpretation and contrast (induction in the
words of Peirce) we control the validity of our beliefs. For Peirce then, the process of abduction
is and inexcusable part of science.McAuliffe [2015]
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It is important to understand at this point that Newton’s and Mach’s views have
a point in common: they want to resolve the problem of inertia by introducing
a unique, universal, conjectured reference system be it explicitly metaphysical or
not. In contrast, Thomson will depart from this view by considering that refer-
ences are to be found within what is experimentally at disposition which is indeed
the actual form in which we use Newton’s laws to explain observed phenomena.
Think for example of a table-top experiment demonstrating 2d-collisions. The
following demonstration was presented by Prof. Miguel Ángel Virasoro 4 to his
students: the table was made of well polished marble and was well levelled; the
carts consisted of a cylindrical base made of steel with a recipient above it where
frozen CO2 was placed. The CO2 gas (produced by sublimation) flew out of the
recipient between the base and the marble, lifting the cart just above the table re-
ducing friction substantially. The reference system provided by the table may be
(approximately) inertial or not. In addition to this real demonstration we have to
imagine the possibility of giving the table a rotatory motion. Being almost de-
coupled from the carts, the rotation of the table does not change the interactions
between carts. Yet, it changes the description of the trajectories. We are in the
presence of apparent rotation. To confuse matters more, the room where the table
is could be rotating as well, so that the inertial system would be given by a table
rotating with respect to the room. But yet, in any case, in the idealised friction-less
situation, there will always exist an inertial system which is not deductible from
appearances.5
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miguel_Ángel_Virasoro_(physicist)
5The position of Mach as relationist cannot be distinguished from that of Neumann, the Alpha
Body of Neumann being the distant stars of Mach. This is most evident when Mach discusses
inertial mass and he states
Definition of equal masses: All those bodies are bodies of equal mass, which,
mutually acting on each other, produce in each other equal and opposite accelera-
tions.[Mach, 1919, p.218]
Unless we define a reference system, there is no such thing as an acceleration for each body.
Considering two bodies, only the relative distance makes sense, and how the relative acceleration
is distributed among the bodies is not known. By adequately choosing the acceleration of the
frame of reference we can make the allocation the way it pleases us. Thus, the definition does
not make sense unless we specify the reference system as the “distant stars” or we explicit are
speaking of “true motion” in Newton’s sense. Inertial systems are discussed in Mach in the
appendix, p.545, while commenting work of Lange that appeared after the first edition of Mach’s
book. Thus, despite his claims regarding being a relationist, essential parts of Mach’s thoughts are
based in a secular version of Newton’s absolute space. It is interesting to realise that the context
of the discussion are the various attempts to reformulate Newton’s mechanics such as Hertz and
Walley [1899], Streintz [1883] and Lange [1886] (see [Pfister, 2014] as well) trying in one way
or another to dispose of the metaphysical absolute space.
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Thomson opens his paper with:
There is no distinction known to men among states of existence of
a body which can give reason for any state being regarded as a state
of absolute rest in space, and any other being regarded as a state of
uniform motion... the only motion of a point that men can know of
or can deal with is motion relative to one, two, three bodies or more
other points. [Thomson, 1884, p. 568-569]
For Thomson, and later for Lange, it is clear that the notion of space must be
sought in the relation between bodies (“...qualities or distinctions of motions of
one or more bodies can be ascertained through knowable relations between these
motions and the motions of one or more other bodies...” [Thomson, 1884, p.
572]). The reference of motion corresponds to the concept of “free bodies”, he
states:
The only motion of a point that men can know of or can deal with
is motion relative to one, two, three, or more other points [...] Any
arrangement whatever of points, lines, or planes, changeless in mu-
tual configuration, will, for present purposes, be named as a reference
frame, or briefly as a frame.[Thomson, 1884, p.569-560]
In the bi-dimensional space provided by the marble-table of the suggested demon-
stration, the bodies move freely as long as they do not collide with each other (or
with the contention rails that prevent them from falling). The motion of such bod-
ies, relative to each other will give the references for any other motion. It is then
wise to adjust the table so that the free bodies move in straight lines at constant
speed with respect to it. In such a form, the table has acquired the same property
than free bodies and we can use it as a reference frame in Thomson’s view.
A free body is certainly a concept, an idea, that emerges by the process of
idealisation introduced by Galilei [1914, day 4]. We can say that:
Definition 1.3. Approximately free: A body is said to be approximately free when
for a given purpose its interactions with other bodies can be ignored within the
established level of tolerance.
There are several instances in which a body can be considered approximately
free because its characteristics (such as charge, mass, volume and others), its rel-
ative position to other bodies, and the lapse of time that is relevant for our purpose,
allow us to expect no appreciable influence from other bodies on it or, what it is
for practical purposes the same, influences are cancelled (as it is usually the case
for electrical influences between statistically neutral bodies).
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Definition 1.4. Free body: A free body is the idealised version of an approxim-
ately free body.
Thus, free bodies exist only in our mind and, at the same time, approximately
free bodies are not too difficult to find if we exercise some due tolerance. Further,
Thomson proposed that inertial reference frames can be introduced by considering
the motion of bodies with respect to a reference point and directions derived from
the relative motion of free bodies.
In [Solari and Natiello, 2018], notions of space and time were developed elab-
orating from the concepts of me vs. other and permanence vs. change. Starting
from the subjective intuitive notion of space we proposed the existence of iner-
tial frames, and a relational formulation of Newtonian mechanics implying that
absolute space (in the sense objected by Leibniz) was not fundamental to New-
ton’s theory. The development in [Solari and Natiello, 2018] rests on the No
Arbitrariness Principle (NAP), namely that no knowledge of Nature depends on
arbitrary decisions. In other words, in any description of Nature arbitrariness is
either absent or “controllable”, in the sense that different arbitrary representations
are connected by a group of transformations.
In the present work we connect, in a mathematical form, the notion of a rela-
tional space with (a) the intuitions developed during the early childhood [Piaget,
1999], (b) the notion of intrinsic reference systems as developed by Thomson and
(c) the No Arbitrariness Principle. As a result, we show that the class of reference
frames that preserve the objective relational dynamics includes non-rotating “ac-
celerated” systems and that only a subclass of them consists of Thomson’s inertial
frames.Neither the fixed stars or the absolute space of Definition 1.1are required
(or relevant) to set the grounds of Newtonian mechanics. The historical approach
is then reverted, from “free bodies move in straight uniform motion with respect
to an inertial frame” into “inertial frames are those reference systems where free
bodies are described as moving in straight uniform motion”. Since the idea of
“free, non-interacting, body” admits approximations, inertial systems admit ap-
proximations as well. Actually, the intuitive use of inertial frames corresponds to
this later notion.
In the next Section we start by developing the notion of space from a Piagetian
perspective, then connecting it with the Cartesian concept of coordinates. Since
Descartes presentation assumes the existence of an external observer, we identify
the relational content of the notion of space and finally develop the theory of
relatively inertial frames, and its connection to Newtonian Mechanics. We discuss
the achievements in the final Section.
14
On the relation of free bodies, inertial sets and arbitrariness
2 The relational notion of space
Piaget describes the construction of the notion of space, objects and spatial
relations in the child:
To understand how the budding intelligence constructs the external
world, we must first ask whether the child, in its first months of life,
conceives and perceives things as we do, as objects that have sub-
stance, that are permanent and of constant dimensions. If this is not
the case, it is then necessary to explain how the idea of an object
(object concept) is built up. The problem is closely connected with
that of space. A world without objects would not present the char-
acter of spatial homogeneity and of coherence in displacements that
marks our universe. Inversely, the absence of “ groups” in the changes
of position would be equivalent to endless transformations, that is,
continuous changes of states in the absence of any permanent object.
In this first chapter, then, substance and space should be considered
simultaneously, and it is only through abstraction that we shall limit
ourselves to object concept.Piaget [1999, p. 3]
The conclusion to which the analysis of object concept has led us is
that in the course of his first twelve to eighteen months the child pro-
ceeds from a sort of initial practical solipsism to the construction of a
universe which includes himself as an element. At first the object is
nothing more, in effect, than the sensory image at the disposal of acts;
it merely extends the activity of the subject and, without being con-
ceived as created by the action itself (since the subject knows nothing
of himself at this level of his perception of the world), it is only felt
and perceived as linked with the most immediate and subjective data
of sensorimotor activity. During the first months the object does not,
therefore, exist apart from the action, and the action alone confers
upon it the quality of constancy. At the other extreme, on the con-
trary, the object is envisaged as a permanent substance independent
of the activity of the self, which the action rediscovers provided it
submits to certain external laws. Furthermore, the subject no longer
occupies the center of the world, a center all the more limited because
the child is unaware of this perspective; he places himself as an object
among other objects and so becomes an integral part of the universe
he has constructed by freeing himself of his personal perspective. Pia-
get [1999, p. 97]
To address the notion of velocity, first we need to address the notion of spatial
relations. Take e.g., a look at a garden. Leave aside (project out) the moving
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leaves and birds, and consider those elements that impress us as keeping a con-
stant relation among themselves (stones, bushes, etc.). We seek for a universal
instruction to move around the garden. We then identify the elements with labels,
i ∈ [1 . . . N ] and summarise the instruction of “going from i to j” as xij . Any
moving instruction can be given as a concatenation of moving instructions, this is
the most essential condition of spatial relations. We use the symbol ⊕ to denote
concatenation. xjj denotes the instruction for remaining at the locus of j, or just
“do nothing”. We call xjj the neutral element, 0 ≡ xjj . We then realise that
xij = xij ⊕ xjj , and further
xij ⊕ xjk = xik
xij ⊕ xjj = xij (1)
xjj ≡ 0
xij = 	xji
The last line in (1) express the perceived fact that the outcome of staying in one
place in the end is the same as the concatenation of going from that place to
any other and returning. Thus, returning becomes the inverse operation of going:
xij = 	xji.
We need now to introduce velocities, and hence, we first need to introduce
change, or its abstract form, time (that time is the abstract form of change was
already known to Aristotle [Aristotle, 1994–2010]). Our observations may indic-
ate/suggest that the organisation of the garden is not always the same, perhaps
because we want to explain where a bird is feeding in the garden. We have then
decided that there are things that, for our purposes, are permanent (do not change)
such as trunks and stones as well as changing objects, e.g., the position of birds.
“Going to bird 1” is not the same type of instruction as “going to tree 1”. The birds
cannot be located with “old instructions”, the location instructions have to be up-
dated as a function of other perceived changes. Each observer may have her/his
own clock, so we write tS to record the changes perceived by S6, and understand
that all the instructions in Eq. 1 were given for a determined time, namely:
xij(tS)⊕ xjk(tS) = xik(tS)
xij(tS)⊕ xjj(tS) = xij(tS)
xjj(tS) ≡ 0
xij(tS) = 	xji(tS)
6Notice that clocks in general come from outside the phenomena in study, they are the remaining
part of the universe from which our mind is isolating the observed. The perception that some
events are recurrent forces us to avoid arbitrary decisions by assigning to the intervals between
consecutive events the same duration. In turn, each interval can be divided using other series of
events (more frequent) equally perceived as having the same essence, thus refining the division
of time. The repetition and idealisation of the process gives us the time.
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Since we have an intuition of regular processes, we may agree on the functioning
of reference clocks and hence consider time-records as real numbers with the usual
sum operation. We finally consider the relation between the rate of change for our
(reference) clock and the rate of change of relative positions,
vij(tS, δ) ≡
xij(tS + δ)	 xij(tS)
(tS + δ)− tS
It follows that
vij(tS, δ)⊕ vjk(tS, δ) = vik(tS, δ) (2)
This is, whatever the clock is, the composition law between velocities must be the
same that the composition law of the space.
2.1 Descartes’ mathematisation of space
The Cartesian view is always the view of an observer, the view that matches
our intuitive construction, namely an extrinsic view. In Descartes’ method, dir-
ections and distances are used instead of giving instructions to move around the
garden based upon landmarks. Thus, the instruction that was “walk from i to j,
xij” becomes “from i walk x steps in the direction êij to j”, that we annotate
xij = êijx. If we now agree to consider only the path from a given reference
position (the position of “ego”), all paths consist in concatenations of this kind of
instructions. Our intuition tell us more, it tells us that there are only three inde-
pendent directions, at least as much as we can perceive. Therefore, the space is
three dimensional and the mathematical construct is Cartesian space, represented
by R3, while ⊕ is the ordinary vector sum. Cartesian space not only inherits the
rules developed for the concatenation of instructions, but adds new rules based
on intuition, such as xê + x′ê′ = x′ê′ + xê (addition is commutative), as well
as the other rules of vector algebra. This idea is underlying the operational part
of Newton’s concepts of absolute space and true motion, seeking for a reference
–somehow external to the process in study– from which changes in motion cor-
respond to forces.
2.2 Subjective and relational spaces
A central issue in Classical Mechanics has been that of formulating mechan-
ics in a fully relational way, this is, not only suppressing the absolute space but
suppressing a Cartesian view based upon a privileged reference system as well.
Absolute space can be seen as the view of a privileged observer: God. Nothing
is gained by changing the name of the privileged observer. Already with Leibniz
the alternative idea of a relational space arose, i.e., a space free of the arbitrariness
17
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of an extrinsic reference. How do we construct an intrinsic view (i.e., without
external observers)?
Individual subjective spaces contain the arbitrariness of the choice of origin
and the choice of references, but what is real presents “characters that are entirely
independent of our opinions about them” [Peirce, 1955, p. 18]. In this sense, the
Cartesian space is not real. In contrast, relational constructions as those we used
to introduce this discussion, like xij , stand their chance of being real. Yet, the
Cartesian view is not completely arbitrary because all arbitrary spaces that we can
produce map into each other in a one-to-one form. Thus, the observations in one
space only need to be translated into the observations in another space (character-
ised by different arbitrariness). We say that the descriptions are intersubjective.
When the differences between subjective spaces correspond to arbitrary elections
that influence the description in a systematic form, as it is the case of the choice
of origin and the choice of directions of reference, the set of transformations re-
lating the different descriptions must satisfy conditions of consistency that allow
us to move in the set of arbitrary descriptions without contradictions. This is the
core meaning of the No Arbitrariness Principle (NAP) [Solari and Natiello, 2018],
in short: the set of transformations associated to arbitrary decisions must form a
group. Actually, considering it in finer detail, there is a group associated with each
class of equivalent arbitrary decisions, this is: a group for the election of reference
point, a group for the election of reference directions, and so on.
We begin by considering one body alone in a 3-dimensional, universe. For
such a body, relative space makes no sense at all. There is nothing else available to
consider (such as e.g., relative positions), apart from the body. When we consider
two bodies, only a one dimensional universe is conceivable. The distance between
the two bodies is the only possibility for geometric change. When we consider at
least three bodies, a distinct difference arises. Arbitrariness in the representation
corresponds to the choice of different orientations and the location of one point
in the system. If the Cartesian space for N bodies corresponds to R3Nand the
group of transformations between arbitrary representations (after restricting the
choice of directions to orthogonal directions) is E(3) = ISO(3) = SO(3) n
R3 (in words: E(3) equals the semi-direct product of its subgroups SO(3) and
R3 - normal subgroup-, hence SO(3) ∼= E(3)/R3). The two component groups
correspond to a global orientation and the position of one point. The real space is
what results of modding out the arbitrariness. This means: a point for N = 1, the
positive line for N = 2. For N ≥ 3 it acquires the characteristics we intuitively
assign to the relational space by removing from the subjective space R3N e.g., a
global orientation and a distinguishable point.
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2.3 Relatively inertial frames
The goal of this Section is to define a reference frame internal to a set of N
bodies moving without (relative) interactions, i.e., N free bodies.





for some constants Cik.
Proof. According to NAP, the law of motion for the relative position, xik,
must be independent of the existence of other bodies since they cannot influence
the motion (otherwise, the pair is not free or it is influenced by arbitrary decisions
regarding the other bodies). Hence,
dxik
dt
= f(xik) = f(xij) + f(xjk) = f(xij + xjk).
Therefore, f must be an affine transformation, f(xik) = Cik + Axik, with Cik, A
constants. We have the additional result that Cik = Cij + Cjk, a principle of
addition of the velocities of free bodies. In addition, since the law must be the
same for all times (there is no privileged time), Cik, A must be constant. Finally,
A = 0 since otherwise the bodies would not be independent of each other, being
their evolution affected by their relative distance.2
Let i, j ∈ (1, 2, 3). We have the relations xij (oriented distances) and we can
consider a large number of different vectors, e.g. the set {xij, dxij = xij(tS+δ)−
xij(tS)}. In a three dimensional space those vectors are not completely arbitrary:
some internal relations will become explicit. Three bodies define a plane, which
along with the relative velocity vectors 1.3 to define a reference frame, except
under singular (full coplanarity or zero velocity) circumstances. We are now in













xij ≡ vij 6= 0
(3)
where vij = limδ→0 vij(tS, δ). The use of a limit is not strictly necessary, since
we will deal with constant vij . It is enough to ask for vij being independent of δ.
In terms of an arbitrary frame, the conditions dxij = 0 and dvij = 0 are ulti-
mately a perception of the observer and as such they introduce subjectivity in the
description. It is this decision made by the subject what creates the space that can
be mathematically represented. Eq. 3 removes much of the subjectivity leaving
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only the arbitrary origin of the subjective frame, which is not involved in the de-
scription of relative positions. Thus, the observer might be linearly accelerated
but the description of relative motion will remain unchanged.
Definition 2.1. Two bodies are relatively inertial if there exists a reference frame,




êij × (xij × êij) = a





xij = a+ bêij
Definition 2.2. N ≥ 3 bodies are relatively inertial if there exists a reference
frame and a sequential order 1, · · · , N such that body k is relatively inertial to
body k + 1. We call this frame a relatively inertial frame for the N bodies.
Corolary 2.1. Free bodies are relatively inertial bodies.
Proof. This is a consequence of Definition 1.4, Definition 2.2 and Lemma
2.1. 2
Lemma 2.2. Relatively inertial is an equivalence relation i.e., a relation ∼ such
that for three bodiesA,B,C it holds thatA∼A,A∼B ⇒ B∼A,A∼B andB∼C ⇒
A∼C.
Proof. A ∼ A since whenever xii = 0 and for arbitrary ê we have a = 0
and b = 0 in Definition 2.1. If a pair a, b exists such that A ∼ B it follows that
B ∼ A with the associated pair −a, b. Since there is a common reference frame
for the whole chain of relatively inertial bodies, the third relation follows from
vector addition rules. We have
xAB = a+ bêAB
xBC = a
′ + b′êBC
xAC = xAB + xBC
= a+ a′ + bêAB + b
′êBC









, where c is some constant
vector and the constant quantity in parenthesis is either zero or some other con-

















we get xAC = (a+ a′ + c) + λtS êAC . 2
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Lemma 2.3. The relatively inertial frames referring to N ≥ 3 relatively inertial
bodies have as group of arbitrariness the translations (which may be time de-
pendent) and the (time independent) rotations composed as a semi-direct product
group.
Proof. The instantaneous relative position of N bodies is invariant under
ISO(3) as explained in Subsection 2.2. With relative positions, the arbitrariness
of the origin of coordinates cancels out, even when it changes as a function of time.
In contrast, a change in the arbitrary choice of orthogonal directions of reference
as a function of time will make d
dtS
êij 6= 0 in the definition 2.1, hence it will break
the concept of relatively inertial set. 2 We observe that in the cited paragraphs of
Thomson, the directions of reference in space correspond to the relative motion
of free bodies. Relatively inertial frames correspond to the situation presented in
Newton [1687], Collorary VI of the chapter Axioms. The introduction of relat-
ively inertial sets of bodies deserves a detailed discussion. In subsection 2.2 we
introduced the instantaneous space for the description of the relational problem of
N bodies. Starting from subjective space, R3N , we arrived to a relational space
where the orbits of points by the action of the group E(3) = ISO(3) were identi-
fied, this is: R3N/E(3). The description of the evolution in time in the relational
space is then represented by a function of time, R, into R3N/E(3). Thus, each




and the set of functions
will be called F . Definition 2.1 uses relative positions, xij , which are invariant
under changes of the origin of the (subjective) coordinates, hence, these mathem-
atical objects are invariant under the action of R(3), the group of translations, and
only rotations in E(3) may change them. From the original group of arbitrariness,
E(3), we are left with the effective action of E(3)/R(3) ∼ SO(3) (a result that
can be intuited as well). Since we have to make such a choice for every time when
considering a trajectory, the group of arbitrariness associated to the set {xij(t)}
consists of (continuous and twice differentiable) time-dependent rotations. Con-
tinuity and differentiability is requested because we have to deal with velocities
in the definition. Because the translation of the subjective origin of coordinates
does not intervene in the definition of the inertial set and inertial frame, we can
allow any arbitrariness to such a collective translation. Note that the arbitrariness
of the description encompassesF and time-dependent rotations, while the class of
relatively inertial frames related to a relatively inertial set of bodies only contains
time-independent rotations, because of Lemma 2.3.
Regarded from any arbitrary relatively inertial frame, the N relatively inertial
bodies belonging to the relatively inertial system may display any possible type of
trajectory xi(t) as indicated above. However, for any pair of bodies we have that
xi(t)−xj(t) = vijt+xij(0), with constant vij , when the reference frame is chosen
with orientations as indicated in definition 2.1. Picking a reference frame that is
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also relatively inertial to the N bodies, the standard description of the bodies from
an inertial frame [ch. 1, Goldstein, 1980] is recovered. Indeed, the N bodies are
then described as having coordinates xi(t) = xi(0) + vit. This view is equivalent
to augmenting the set of bodies in one, adding an extra “body”, representing the
origin of coordinates. The transformations among inertial frames in the standard
setting, the Galilean group, arise as a consequence of this choice (it corresponds
to picking different extra bodies relatively inertial to the set of N , having different
constant relative velocity).
Definition 2.3. Inertial frame. Inertial frames are the relatively inertial frames
associated to free bodies.
Corolary 2.2. Newton’s laws hold only in inertial frames.
It is possible for a set of bodies to be relatively inertial without being free,
hence two separate sets of bodies can be each relatively inertial and yet no inertial
frame may be available for all the bodies to pertain to a relatively inertial set.
Remark 2.1. The “added value” of the concept of relatively inertial is twofold.
On one side, the concept is intrinsic to a system and hence independent of the
system being e.g., accelerated relative to some external reference. Moreover, it is
fully compatible with classical, Newtonian mechanics, thus eliminating a meta-
physical ingredient discussed for centuries, now without any reference to e.g.,
“distant stars”. In an inertial system, any relative motion that deviates from con-
stant velocity corresponds with forces/interactions, i.e., to bodies that are not free.
However, the statement is not true if we replace “inertial system” by “relatively
inertial system”7.
Remark 2.2. The relatively inertial class is larger that the inertial class asso-
ciated to the inertial frames 2.3. It contains any kind of global time-dependent
displacement of the frame and the objects under study and, in particular, acceler-
ated systems as those considered in Einstein’s equivalence principle (stating the
complete physical equivalence of a homogeneous gravitational field and a cor-
responding acceleration of the reference system [Einstein, 1907]). Regarded in
this way, the equivalence principle is not an independent principle but a particu-
lar case of the more general NAP and the presently derived concept of relatively
inertial.
Remark 2.3. The concept of force in Classical Mechanics has been gradually
“naturalised” by habit (in the sense that forces became treated as observables,
rather than as meta-observables –ideated–). Consequently, an inertial-mass has
7In [Solari and Natiello, 2018] it is assumed explicitly that the reference corresponds to a free
body.
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followed, relating force and the actually observable acceleration. However, a
detailed construction of mechanics [Solari and Natiello, 2018] shows that the
concept of inertial mass rests completely on the concept of gravitational mass.
Therefore, it makes no sense to distinguish them. Hence, the “weak equivalence
principle” [Dicke, 1981] (stating that inertial mass equals gravitational mass) is
a social construction rather than a basic ingredient of mechanics.
3 Discussion and conclusions
It is worth to discuss the implications of Definition 1.3. In practice, we always
deal with approximate notions, be it of free bodies, relatively inertial bodies or
inertial frames. The possibility of interacting or not with other objects/bodies is
always considered from a limited perspective and it is subject to revision whenever
necessary. While perfection is probably unattainable outside the mathematical
universe, the pair of concepts approximation and tolerance are quantifiable and
admit the possibility of refinement and improvement.
We have shown that there are two different conceptions of relational space,
one that preserves the intuition of the subjective space and constitutes a secular
version of absolute space resting upon hypothetical fixed stars, and a second one,
almost forgotten, that rests upon the concept of inertial frames, free bodies and
internal relations. Such distinction parallels the notion of Absolute space (Defin-
ition 1.1) in Newton and that of absolute motion (Definition 1.2) which is the
operative concept in Newton’s Principia. The first one can be called metaphys-
ical as well as it is not true that for any practical use we identify inertial systems
by referring them to the fixed stars or any other equivalent primary reference as
Neumann’s Alpha Body or the distribution of masses of a –necessarily assumed–
finite universe. The second version is of practical use but does not support the
simple intuition as crystallised in the Cartesian representation of space, but rather
requires a philosophical intuition Husserl [1983] or equivalently, to acknowledge
the process of abduction in general and the production of reality by the building
intelligence of the child.
Leibniz’ relationism is the result of a discipline of mind based on the “Prin-
ciple Sufficient Reason” and the “Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles” which
relate deeply with the “No Arbitrariness Principle” and the process of modding
out arbitrariness (subjective views) applied in the present construction. In con-
trast, providing an arbitrary reference for the space, such as fixed stars, violates
NAP, and as such accepts Leibniz’ conclusions regarding the space but disdains
Leibniz’ main rational principles.
In terms of classical mechanics we have shown that it is possible to introduce
inertial frames and sets of inertial bodies without introducing an Absolute Space
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(or universal references of no actual use) complementing the work in [Solari and
Natiello, 2018]. We have also shown that the new approach includes a larger
variety of reference systems.
In the view of the present work, Newton’s definition 1.1 of absolute space
plays only a metaphysical role. There is no way of working out from absolute
space the meaning of true motion (definition 1.2) and there is no way to put abso-
lute space to test, as Newton explains in the Scholium. We suggest that its need
must be considered in psychological terms as it relates to initial perceptions of
the child in the construction of the notion of space. Absolute space can be safely
replaced with a secular relational space such as the one produced by taking the
“fixed stars” as alleged reference, since we are only changing the useless meta-
physics. Why should free bodies be in uniform motion in the frame of reference
given by the fixed stars? Yet, the metaphysical discussion has entertained most
philosophers [Barbour, 1982].
In contrast, the notion of true motion (definition 1.2), closely linked to the
principle of inertia, can be inferred from observations and the abducted result has
stood firmly all falsification attempts. It stands as a true belief, one that “shapes
our actions” [Peirce, 1994, CP 5.371], on its own right. In this work we have
shown how inertial frames follow logically from it. Since inertial frames cor-
respond to the setting where Newton’s axioms hold true, hence all of Newton’s
mechanics rests on the notion of true motion.
In achieving our result we rested, much as Leibniz did, on a sanitising concept,
in our case the “No Arbitrariness Principle” (NAP) and its mathematical formula-
tion. While NAP operates before Newton’s laws of mechanics, a residual action
is left. Since there is not a unique inertial system, there should be a group of op-
erations transforming statements in one inertial system into statements in another
one, while the laws of mechanics remain the same. Thus, this relativity principle is
not an independent construct somehow unique to physics but only a consequence
of NAP, having to account for a residual arbitrariness.
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